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Introduction  
Best practices recommendations in governmental budgeting and financial management often 
center on improving transparency. The full disclosure of key information about the fiscal health of 
a government is thought to be critical to ensuring citizen trust in government, reducing 
corruption and ensuring fiscal stability (Kopits and Craig, 1998). Transparency also creates a level 
of trust that allows the financial markets around government debt to function properly. Ideas of 
transparency are grounded in an explicit or intuitive understanding of a principal-agent problem, 
where the voters or “principals” have a particular need or want a particular product, and the 
“agents” or governmental actors propose and implement policies to address this need. The 
challenge in this relationship is that methods used by the agent, and at times even the outcomes 
produced, may be opaque to the principal, and thus, the principal has difficulty holding the agent 
accountable (Mueller, 1989).  
This principal-agent problem underpins the theory of “fiscal illusion,” where a central theme is 
that elected officials prefer policies that appear to give voters something for nothing by pushing 
costs for a public service into the future (Buchanan, 1964) or by devolving costs and 
accountability to other levels of government (Bennett and DiLorenzo, 1983; Fiorina, 1986). The 
voters believe that they are getting a public service at no additional cost to themselves when in 
fact they are failing to perceive that they will pay at some point in the future or are paying 
through an unexpected mechanism, such as local taxes rather than state taxes. The cure for fiscal 
illusion is more information so that voters can hold elected officials and government agencies – 
the agents – accountable.1 
This paper draws on data from fiscal years (FY) 2015-17 collected as part of the Volcker Alliance’s 
Truth and Integrity in Government Finance project, which reviews fiscal transparency and 
financial management practices across the states. The project studies whether states have 
structural deficits that are patched through short-term solutions, pushing hard decisions into the 
future (and giving voters the illusion of “something for nothing”), and further, examines the 
extent to which this is visible through existing documentation. This analysis draws on the 29-
question Volcker Alliance survey and supplements this material with additional research on the 
states to study whether states report structural deficits directly or at least provide the basic 
pieces of an analysis that would allow citizens to assess long-term structural deficits 
                                                            
1 Bourdeaux (forthcoming) has raised the issue that the problem might not be fiscal illusion per se but that human 
beings generally are biased towards current consumption, and as such, voters might be complicit in efforts to push 
costs into the future. Behavioral economics documents a number of cases of such behavior. However, people may 
develop commitment devices to protect their future selves from their current selves. One way of thinking about this 
dilemma concretely is to consider whether GASB rules encouraging states to disclose future liabilities such as pension 
and OPEB liabilities will prove sufficient inducement to states to address these issues (this would be the fiscal illusion 
answer) or do states need concrete laws limiting such liabilities, as states have long done with debt liability, to force 
their current selves to be disciplined about future costs (a behavioral economics answer). Rating agencies and reports 
such as the Volcker Alliance project might also be beneficial not only for transparency but also because they create 
current penalties through loss of state “reputation” for engaging in practices that have long-term costs.  
2 
cslf.gsu.edu  Fiscal Transparency and Accountability 
independently. We conclude that the basic analyses are not in place to assess effectively whether 
states face a long-term structural deficit. Although most states provide current and past year 
information about state expenditure obligations and revenue streams, this information can be 
difficult to find and assemble. For the most part, the states generally do not produce serious 
forecasts documenting expenditure and revenue trends, much less forecasts that incorporate the 
impact of long-term liabilities on future state operations. 
Literature Review 
Research on transparency at the state level is sparse. The published literature primarily examines 
the concept at a country or global level with limited information concerning state-level 
government in the United States. The extant literature discusses the merits and effects of 
transparency as well as the possible pitfalls and also considers the conditions that warrant more 
transparency in government. Efforts to measure the effects of transparency also receive 
considerable attention, and several groups have organized guidelines to help governments, 
mostly at the national level, become more transparent.  
POTENTIAL BENEFITS O F TRANSPARENCY IN GO VERNMENT 
Much of the research espouses the potential benefits of transparency. Improved fiscal 
performance is often seen as the central goal of a transparent government, and the research 
proposes several reasons why this may occur (Arbatli and Escolano, 2015; Bastida and Benito, 
2007; Kopits and Craig, 1998). Open information can provide the public a means to impose fiscal 
discipline on elected officials (Benito and Bastida, 2009; Heald, 2003). With stricter fiscal 
discipline and clear accounting for revenues, expenditures, and liabilities, officials can be held 
accountable for policy decisions with less room for blame-shifting (Heald, 2003). Improved 
accountability may also reduce governmental corruption (Bastida and Benito, 2007; Heald, 2003; 
Khagram, de Renzio and Fung, 2013).  
A transparent government would make it easier to identify favors or special treatment that 
politicians may afford special interest groups and help reduce inequities in fiscal practices 
(Garrett and Vermeule, 2006; Kopits and Craig, 1998). Additionally, a transparent budget and 
auditing process may reduce the likelihood political actors resort to fiscal gimmicks or tricks to 
manipulate the budget and, instead, shift attention to outcomes and performance (Benito and 
Bastida, 2009). 
Another set of benefits concern state debt and liabilities. Several studies in the literature have 
suggested that open government operations may improve credit ratings (Arbatli and Escolano, 
2015; Hameed, 2011). A closely related observation is that by making their assets and liabilities 
more accessible, states may find it easier to borrow money at lower interest rates (Hameed, 
2011; Khagram, de Renzio and Fung, 2013). Furthermore, by shedding light on the status of long-
term liabilities, politicians may be pressured into funding these liabilities to reduce the future 
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burden on the state (Polackova Brixi and Schick, 2002). The public can also benefit from more 
transparent pension plans, as beneficiaries would be able to monitor and optimize their portfolios 
more easily (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009). 
The research also proposes more intangible effects of transparency. By removing the shroud of 
secrecy and allowing the public to see how their taxes are used, transparency would be able to 
redeem the public’s trust in the government (Linden, 2010). An empirical study by Alt and Lowry 
(2010) has shown that transparency helps reduce the likelihood that politicians are not reelected 
after they introduce tax increases. Additionally, transparency can better involve the public and 
spur the people’s interest in becoming more active in the political process (Benito and Bastida, 
2009).  
POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF TRANSPARENCY  IN GOVERNMENT 
Although the literature describes numerous potential benefits of governmental transparency, 
several authors have raised concerns about unchecked increases in transparency. Beyond 
obvious concerns about the upfront costs associated with the time, labor, and capital needed to 
make a government more transparent (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 2010; Heald, 2003; Linden, 
2010), misinterpretation of information is a potential drawback. The media is a related source of 
concern. Negative news tends to be reported more prominently than positive news, which can 
portray the government as more incompetent than it may be in reality (Heald, 2003). Media 
scrutiny is often unforgiving and can generate unrealistic expectations about how government 
can and should be run (Linden, 2010). Ultimately, this level of transparency and criticism can 
affect politicians’ decision-making abilities, making them less likely to put things in writing or 
pursue alternative options that may be perceived negatively by the press or public. 
Misinterpretation can also happen in other ways. Heald (2003) uses the example of the common 
need to bundle policy announcements, where confidentiality can be beneficial to reduce the 
chance of individual pieces of information being misconstrued out of context. Particularly with 
computer-based transparency, information can be misinterpreted because the data is often 
quantitative and the context may be ambiguous; it may be difficult to understand the data fully 
without speaking to an individual within the agency (Meijer, 2009). 
Finally, transparency may have the unintended side effect of making the government vulnerable 
to powerful interest groups (Heald, 2003). As Rose and Smith (2011) attest, “while individual 
citizens face virtually insurmountable hurdles to collective action, mobilized groups seeking 
transfers to narrowly defined economic interests are well situated to take advantage of available 
information.” In this context, more transparency would harm the public interest overall (Garrett 
and Vermeule, 2006). 
DETERMINANTS OF FISC AL TRANSPARENCY 
As one would imagine, undesirable fiscal outcomes are often the impetus to increase 
transparency in governmental financial operations (Alt, Lassen and Rose, 2006; Khagram, de 
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Renzio and Fung, 2013). Economic crises in particular can bring the need for transparency to the 
forefront of political discussions and can quickly affect change. Similarly, corruption cases can 
bring the issue quickly to the public’s attention. Studies also show that increased partisanship or 
political polarization prompts legislatures to pass transparency policies, as politicians bind the 
hands of their opposition, as well as their own (Alt, Lassen and Rose, 2006; Khagram, de Renzio 
and Fung, 2013). 
TRANSPARENCY MEAS UREMENTS 
Measuring transparency and its effects has proved challenging. Heald (2003) has described the 
difficulty in pinpointing direct effects because of the “level of abstraction which does not make it 
clear what the ‘objects’ of transparency are”; in particular, there is no consensus regarding what 
constitutes “effectiveness.” Nonetheless, several indices have been created to measure levels of 
transparency (Benito and Bastida, 2009; Heald, 2003; Kopits and Craig, 1998; Von Hagen, 1992). 
One of the most prominent indices, the Open Budget Index, was created by the International 
Budget Partnership to assess national-level transparency data based on eight budget documents: 
the pre-budget statement, executive budget proposal, enacted budget, in-year report, mid-year 
report, year-end report, audit report and citizens budget (Khagram, de Renzio and Fung, 2013). 
The pre-budget statement describes the economic assumptions used in budget development as 
well as the anticipated revenues, expenditures and debt levels; the citizens budget presents a 
shortened, easily readable and accessible version of the other seven documents.  
At the state level, Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) adapted a transparency index to evaluate budget 
procedures. The index consists of nine items that can be written as questions and presented to 
state budget officers as a survey. The questions address the characteristics of revenue and 
expenditure forecasting, the use of generally-accepted-accounting principles, the formation of 
appropriations bills, the type of budget cycle and the presence of performance measures. The 
responses are translated to a numerical scale and added together, with a higher index score 
indicating more transparent budget procedures. 
BEST PRACTICES 
Several large organizations have published best practices guides for fiscal transparency (Benito 
and Bastida, 2009; IMF, 2014; OECD, 2002; Ramkumar and Shapiro, 2010). For the International 
Monetary Fund, Kopits and Craig (1998) define three dimensions of good practice: institutional 
transparency, accounting transparency and transparency of indicators and projections. The  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency Report (2002) details specific information that should be made available to the 
public in numerous documents. The suggestions include commentaries on revenue and 
expenditure data, the economic assumptions used in making projections, comparative revenue 
and expenditure data for previous fiscal years, multi-year forecasts, and comprehensive looks at 
assets compared to long-term liabilities. The OECD also promotes a pre-election report that the 
public can use to gauge the status of the government’s finances accurately before an election. 
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In sum, while the literature is inconclusive about the benefits or object of transparency, oversight 
or coordinating institutions that promote best practices in public finance—such as the OECD—
have forged ahead with promoting its importance and in recent years have paid increasing 
attention to driving up transparency around long-term fiscal health, which is more difficult to 
discern from existing fiscal documents. Component parts of understanding long-term fiscal health 
include 1) actual provision of the information, 2) ease of access and 3) presentation of the 
information for people with non-expert levels of financial literacy. 
Methodology 
This analysis draws on data from the first year of the Volcker Alliance project to assess whether 
state governments in the United States provide information on long-term fiscal health in a way 
that is easily accessible to the average citizen. As part of the project, twelve universities across 
the country gathered fiscal information from all fifty states, grounded in a 29-question survey. 
Key questions that informed this research included the following. 
• Structural deficits: Does the state disclose projected structural general fund deficits 
(recurring revenues that do not cover ongoing expenditures) and other comparable 
liabilities?  
This analysis examines whether states explicitly disclose and evaluate structural deficits as well as 
what type of data is presented as part of a state’s assessment of a structural deficit. A complete 
analysis of a structural deficit begins with a long-term forecast. The Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities defines “multi-year” as three years beyond the upcoming fiscal year (McNichol and 
Leachman, 2015). For this paper, we have defined “multi-year” more leniently as three fiscal 
years beyond the current year, still a difficult threshold for many states to reach. A complete 
analysis will also use a moderately sophisticated strategy for projecting revenues and 
expenditures and will incorporate an assessment of one-time revenues and deferred 
expenditures as well as the impact of long-term liabilities such as pensions, other post-
employment benefits, debt and deferred maintenance. The analysis also examines the relative 
accessibility of this information to the average citizen. Since most states do not provide a 
complete assessment of a potential structural deficit, the analysis then goes on to assess the 
extent to which states produce and make accessible the component pieces of such an analysis.  
• Multi-year forecasts: Does the state disclose multi-year revenue/expenditure forecasts 
(at least three years) in the budget documents?  
Assuming states do not explicitly discuss a structural deficit, the inclusion of a long-term, multi-
year forecast should, in theory, provide a proxy for a structural deficit analysis. Indeed, some of 
the states we evaluated—such as Georgia—responded that this analysis was where they would 
report a potential structural deficit.  
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The Volcker Alliance questionnaire asks whether states explicitly provide a multi-year expenditure 
and revenue forecast, and our analysis further evaluated whether these would truly reveal a 
structural deficit. For instance: does the state’s revenue and expenditure forecast clearly show 
the methodology for how the forecast was built? Is this a sophisticated methodology or one that 
simply applies generic inflation and population factors to current operating expenditures? In 
particular, are there explanations of big-ticket growth items like Medicaid and education? Does 
this methodology include a current services assessment or the amount of expenditures required 
to keep the current service levels constant? This approach in turn would need to include some 
sort of projection associated with the growth in workload. Does it include an analysis of debt 
service requirements over time, pension and OPEB liabilities, and deferred maintenance? On the 
revenue side, does the analysis incorporate an evaluation of tax expenditures that may affect 
long-term liabilities? Last, is any of this information easy to access and interpret for an average 
citizen?  
While the methodology for the forecast was evaluated by examining budget documents, 
accessibility was determined initially by a Google search. To make financial documents easily 
accessible to the public, institutional websites should be arranged in ways that facilitates finding 
documents using large search engines like Google or Bing. Ultimately, the state’s websites should 
allow as few ‘clicks’ as possible for a citizen to reach the desired information. We discovered that, 
for the most part, only the revenue and expenditure forecasts can be found using direct links 
from Google’s search results page by searching for “[state] revenue forecast” or “[state] 
expenditure forecast/outlook.” The results presented below indicate whether a direct link to the 
forecast appears in the first 10 search results using these search terms. We created an ordinal 
metric to describe the ease of finding the revenue and expenditure forecasts: 1) easily accessible 
from Google results; 2) accessible for an average citizen if they have already found the budget 
documents; and 3) accessible in the budget documents for someone with expert knowledge. “N” 
indicates that the information is not available in the budget documents.  
An example of a “3” value is found in Georgia’s multi-year revenue forecast. While the Governor’s 
Budget Report discusses the upcoming fiscal year’s revenues in the first few pages, the multi-year 
revenue forecast is tucked away near the end of the report at the bottom of the multi-year 
expenditure forecasts (GA OPB, 2017). The odds are good that a layperson would be unlikely to 
stumble upon this analysis without expert guidance. The major program forecasts also use the 1-
2-3-N format because this information is often embedded in the expenditure forecast. 
• Long-term liabilities: Was the contribution to public employee pension/OPEB (other post-
employment benefits other than pensions) less than 100 percent of the actuarially 
required or determined amount? Does the state provide tables listing outstanding debt 
and debt service costs in the budget documentation? Is the estimated cost of deferred 
infrastructure maintenance disclosed in the budget documentation? 
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Our final question is the extent to which a state discloses the future implications of critical long-
term liabilities such as pensions, OPEB, debt and deferred maintenance. This section draws on 
the survey questions and further assesses the accessibility of such information. Pension and OPEB 
liabilities can be complex, and the total liabilities depend on numerous factors. In times of fiscal 
stress, pension and OPEB obligations may be postponed or payments reduced to lessen the 
burden in other areas, but these actions only increase liabilities in the future. To understand the 
true value of these obligations, the budget documents should detail the actuarially required 
contributions (ARC) and projected contributions into the future, as well as all earnings from 
investments, assets held and the economic assumptions underlying the projected liabilities, 
including the assumed discount rates.  
While many states include annual debt service payments in the appropriations acts, many do not 
include a broader view of total debt obligations, an integral part of understanding a state’s fiscal 
health. Providing debt service schedules over time allows individuals to see the trends in the 
payment schedule: Does the state pay the same amount every year? Does it pay more in the 
short term and much less in later years? Does the state pay little or nothing in the present and 
push off much of the debt burden far into the future? None of these questions can be answered 
easily without the budget documents presenting the debt service over time. As with multi-year 
revenue and expenditure forecasts, knowing the future liability of debt service allows 
policymakers to address potential policy and budgetary issues in the present, helping to avoid 
future difficulties.   
Accounting for deferred maintenance also contributes to the full picture of state fiscal health. 
Deferred maintenance refers to repairs or other maintenance activities that have been pushed 
off into the future to avoid the expense in the present. Because the postponed expenses will 
need to be made in the future, not openly accounting for these liabilities leaves the state 
vulnerable to possibly (more) expensive, unexpected and untimely repairs.  
Long-term liability information is difficult to locate using a simple search engine request. We 
originally performed Google searches following a template of "[state] [topic keywords]" looking 
for results that link directly to the documents or to closely related pages where the document can 
be found. For long-term liabilities, our topic keyword search terms included: “debt 
service/payments/bonds,” “retirement pension,” “retirement OPEB,” “deferred maintenance/ 
repairs.” For example, looking for Louisiana pension obligations, we searched for “Louisiana 
retirement pension.” Unfortunately, very few of the long-term obligation searches returned with 
viable results. We found the best way to gather this material is to locate the budget documents 
first, particularly the executive budget document, the appropriations act, and potentially relevant 
legislative session summaries, by navigating the websites of the executive and legislative 
branches.  
It should be noted that long-term obligations are presented in the Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFR), but these documents are retrospective in nature and often do not 
provide multi-year projections of long-term obligations or payment plans. The tables below show 
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how the information is presented in these documents: “F” indicating a forecast of at least three 
future years is present in the budget documents; “C” indicating only the current or upcoming 
fiscal cycle’s information is present; and “N” indicating the information is not present in the 
budget documents. Additionally, with such variation in how states disclose information, 
particularly legislative reports or session summaries, there are potentially documents that include 
the previously discussed information we were unable to locate despite our thorough efforts. 
Nonetheless, if we were unable to locate a document, it is unlikely that the average citizen would 
find it either, and more clarity in the future presentation of information may still be warranted. 
Results 
STRUCTURAL DEFICITS  
As Table 1 below shows, every state has made the effort to implement a transparency website of 
some kind. While more information may be required for an average citizen to have the full 
picture of a state’s fiscal health, such a website is a good-faith effort to improve fiscal 
transparency practices and governmental accountability. Thirteen states disclosed structural 
deficits in a concrete, systematic way. West Virginia, Maryland and California, for example, 
disclose potential shortfalls and analyze in detail the causes, future impacts and solutions. West 
Virginia includes this breakdown prominently in its executive budget document, making it 
accessible and easily understandable to the general public through its narratives, while 
Maryland’s analysis is produced through the legislative branch and may be more difficult for the 
public to locate. 
West Virginia describes structural deficits in a detailed six-year financial plan in the executive 
budget proposal (volume I); it is presented upfront in the executive summary section and 
updated annually by the State Budget Office (WV SBO, 2016). The proposal also includes sections 
on long-range issues, revenue sources, debt summaries and economic forecasts, which 
contribute to the understanding of the structural balance of the state. The six-year financial plan 
shows the current fiscal health of the state through analyses of revenues and expenditures and 
then extrapolates them into five future fiscal years while maintaining the current level of services. 
The forecasting process looks at job growth and demographic changes, compares the state to 
U.S. national trends and focuses on changes to important drivers of state revenue such as coal 
and natural gas. West Virginia’s assumptions also consider potential problems mostly centered on 
demographic issues: the population is aging, unhealthy and declining in number. The revenue 
forecast is based on data from IHS Economics and incorporates legislative changes affecting 
revenue streams, such as the FY 2017 diversion of some personal income tax collections to OPEB 
obligations. On the expenditure side, the state writes in-depth narratives describing the 
expenditure growth and program changes needed to maintain a current level of services and 
includes changes to retirement contributions, public education and Medicaid. Each program 
section takes into account program-specific inflation and legislative changes. Medicaid, for 
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example, considers the cost of healthcare inflation, changes in enrollment, quickly rising drug 
costs and cost containment options. The state also adds 2-percent employee raises to the 
assumptions for the FY 2018-21 forecasts.  
West Virginia’s executive budget proposal also contains information on long-term liabilities and 
one-time expenditures. Tax expenditure information is presented in the revenue summaries 
section, which has tables listing estimated current fiscal year costs of tax expenditures including 
tax credits, tax incremental financing and miscellaneous tax preferences (WV SBO, 2016). The 
long-term outlook section discusses pension and OPEB liabilities. OPEB is a high priority in the 
state, and the FY 2017 executive proposal describes changes to address its liabilities, such as $30 
million in additional funding per year between FY 2017 and FY 2021. Long-term debt obligations 
are thoroughly explained in the executive proposal as well. Every general obligation and revenue 
bond still outstanding is described, and the overall debt burden is projected through FY 2021 
along with debt service payments through full payment. Deferred expenditures are not 
mentioned in the budget documents, but one-time expenditures such as surpluses or rainy day 
funds to address budget shortfalls are described in the narratives, and the long-term forecast 
includes a line item of one-time expenditures for building projects and renovations through FY 
2021.  
Overall, West Virginia provides a good view of its structural (im)balance. An easy-to-understand 
graph showing the diverging revenues and expenditures over time allows the general public to 
see when and to what extent a gap is expected. The frank disclosure of problem areas helps the 
governor and the legislature make informed choices in the present while also allowing the public 
to remain involved. 
Maryland also explicitly discloses structural deficits. The Spending Affordability Committee, a 
bicameral legislative group, produces an annual Interim Report that documents structural 
balance in the state (MD SAC, 2016). The committee assesses Maryland’s economic status based 
on income and wealth data then incorporates “economic performance, revenue estimates, and 
budget requirements” (MD SAC, 2016, p.1). Employment statistics are used in the analysis, and 
Maryland compares its past and projected jobs performance to national trends as well as to its 
neighboring state, Virginia.  
The budget utilizes a current services approach and adjusts the forecast based on caseload 
assumptions, inflation, salary increases and changes to laws and policies. The committee’s 
evaluation of revenues and expenditures projects structural imbalances and itemizes the 
estimated costs of major programs such as Medicaid after adjusting for program-specific 
inflationary factors. Unlike West Virginia, Maryland does not feature comprehensive tax 
exemptions in its analysis of future revenues nor does it thoroughly discuss OPEB liabilities. 
Pensions and debt are analyzed in detail, however. In its summary of structural balance, the 
committee presents an easy-to-read graph of ongoing revenues and expenditures six years into 
the future, showing what would happen to a deficit if not addressed in the present. Overall, while 
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both West Virginia and Maryland are thorough in their analysis of structural deficits, West 
Virginia is easier to access and easier for a layperson to understand; more details of West 
Virginia’s long-term forecasting processes are discussed in the next section. 
Another example of a state that discloses structural balance issues well is California. As part of its 
annual budget documents, California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office produces a fiscal outlook 
document that analyzes the state’s revenues, expenditures and major programs into four future 
fiscal years and estimates the projected revenue and expenditure balance under positive and 
negative economic scenarios (CA LAO, 2016). The outlook also briefly discusses forecasts for debt 
and pension obligations. Notably, California provides comprehensive analyses of its major 
program initiatives, which it breaks down into education, health and human services, judiciary 
and criminal justice, employee compensation and retirement costs, unemployment insurance, 
and debt service on infrastructure bonds. This information underpins their methodology for 
projecting expenditures. 
The fiscal outlook accompanying California’s FY 2018 budget emphasizes the uncertainty for the 
state in the next five years, which becomes apparent when comparing their positive and negative 
economic forecasts. Unlike West Virginia and Maryland that depict deficits with line graphs 
showing diverging revenues and expenditures, California uses bar charts to show surpluses or 
deficits over time. In the FY 2018 report, the positive, “under growth” projection details operating 
surpluses through FY 2021, including the amounts destined for the rainy day fund; the negative, 
“mild recession” scenario shows operating deficits and how much of the gap would be covered by 
the rainy day fund balance. Some years of the outlook also include a consolidated chart of 
revenues and expenditure projections under positive, negative and main/neutral scenarios (CA 
LAO, 2014, p.60). This chart also incorporates debt payments and rainy day fund deposits under 
the three scenarios and clearly displays the “bottom line” surplus/deficit calculation at the 
bottom. 
 
Table 1. Availability and Ease of Interpreting Structural Balance, FY 2015-17 
 
DISCLOSES 
STRUCTURAL 
DEFICITS EXPLICITLY 
TRANSPARENCY-
CENTERED WEBSITE 
ALL REV., EXP. AND 
LONG-TERM 
LIABILITIES ON 
WEBSITE 
ALL REV., EXP. AND 
LONG-TERM 
LIABILITIES IN MULTI-
YEAR FORECAST 
Alabama N Y N N 
Alaska Y Y N N 
Arizona Y Y N N 
Arkansas N Y N N 
California Y Y N N 
Colorado N Y N N 
Connecticut Y Y N N 
Delaware N Y N N 
Florida N Y N N 
Georgia N Y N N 
Hawaii N* Y N N 
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Idaho N Y N N 
Illinois Y Y N N 
Indiana N Y N N 
Iowa N Y N N 
Kansas N Y N N 
Kentucky N Y N N 
Louisiana N Y N N 
Maine N Y N N 
Maryland Y Y N N 
Massachusetts Y° Y N N 
Michigan N Y N N 
Minnesota Y Y N N 
Mississippi N* Y N N 
Missouri N Y N N 
Montana N^ Y N N 
Nebraska N* Y N N 
Nevada N Y N N 
New Hampshire N Y N N 
New Jersey N Y N N 
New Mexico N Y N N 
New York Y Y N N 
North Carolina Y Y N N 
North Dakota N Y N N 
Ohio N Y N N 
Oklahoma N Y N N 
Oregon N Y N N 
Pennsylvania N* Y N N 
Rhode Island Y Y N N 
South Carolina N Y N N 
South Dakota N Y N N 
Tennessee N Y N N 
Texas N Y N N 
Utah N Y N N 
Vermont N Y N N 
Virginia N Y N N 
Washington Y Y N N 
West Virginia Y Y N N 
Wisconsin N Y N N 
Wyoming N Y N N 
Note: Answers may not match with Volcker Alliance responses because of definition differences. 
Y: Yes; N: No;  
*Deficit or structural balance concern was identified but included no substantial description or analysis. 
^Forecast was present but less than three future years. 
°In its executive proposal, Massachusetts details the methodology behind long-term forecasting and structural 
balance in narrative form but does not provide year-by-year breakdowns of forecasts. 
MULTI-YEAR FORECASTS 
Our definition of a multi-year forecast requires at least three future fiscal years to ensure at least 
one year is projected beyond the upcoming budget cycle because 19 states have biennial budget 
cycles. As Table 2 below shows, most states produced multi-year revenue forecasts, but 19 did 
not fulfill our multi-year criteria: Tennessee, for example, projects future revenues but only for 
two years. Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Wyoming produce revenue but not expenditure forecasts, and Kentucky only projects 
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expenditures two years beyond the current year. Only Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Minnesota and New York produce detailed, multi-year projections of major program costs 
that are easily accessible through Google searches. California, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas 
and Washington estimate tax expenditures at a multi-year level, although Washington only 
produces these analyses every four years. Kentucky, Maine, Ohio and Oregon project tax 
expenditures beyond the upcoming fiscal year but fall short of the three future year criteria. 
Several other states also produce tax expenditure reports but look retrospectively at the costs in 
previous fiscal years. Only a few states, such as Tennessee and West Virginia, include tax 
expenditures in their executive budget proposals. Only California, Minnesota and Pennsylvania 
produce multi-year revenue, expenditure, major program and tax expenditure forecasts, but the 
states vary widely in their accessibility and the rigor of their assumptions.  
Like California, discussed above, Florida and Virginia use some of the most detailed long-term 
forecasting assumptions. Florida’s revenue and expenditure forecasts are contained in a user-
friendly, long-range financial outlook supplied by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the 
House Appropriations Committee and the Legislative Office of Economic and Demographic 
Research (Florida Forecast, 2015). Beyond the three-year forecasts, the document covers 
potential risks to the revenue estimates, legal concerns and budget drivers. The budget drivers 
are divided into the critical needs group, which must be funded, and the other high priority needs 
group, which includes items often funded in recent years. Major programs such as public 
education, for example, include adjustments for increasing workload and enrollment to maintain 
the same level of state funds per student.  
Virginia releases its multi-year forecasts through the Department of Planning and Budget in 
tandem with the governor’s biennial budget proposal, but the forecasts are embedded in a 
general fund six-year financial plan (VA DPB, 2016). An average citizen would need to know the 
forecasts are in this document and know how to find it on the Department of Planning and 
Budget’s website—it is not easily accessible to a layperson. Nonetheless, the financial plan shows 
comparisons of revenue and expenditure forecasting six years in the future, then breaks down 
expenditures by agency with detailed assumptions for each agency’s expenditure projections 
including projected policy changes. Virginia’s public education assumptions include biennial re-
benchmarking with odd-year enrollment increases to maintain full funding of the state’s 
Standards of Quality funding goals. The financial plan has limited revenue assumptions, but the 
consensus forecasting groups’ reports on the Secretary of Finances website provide thorough 
analyses of revenue expectations. Both Florida and Virginia have the most complete analyses of 
forecasts in the southeast, but Florida is easier for the public to access and understand. 
West Virginia also creates a six-year financial plan, as discussed previously, presented in the 
executive budget document, and South Carolina creates a similar three-year financial outlook 
produced by its Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office (WV SBO, 2016; SC RFAO, 2016). The South 
Carolina outlook is more difficult to locate than the West Virginia plan. In both, the forecasts are 
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tied more to state-level economic trends and less to national ones. Nevertheless, the major 
programs incorporate inflation, workload increases and potential policy/program changes, which 
are thoroughly discussed.  
Utah’s forecasting process offers insight into how other states would be able to strengthen their 
forecasts (Lucia, 2016). The state has integrated a stress test into its forecasting process that is 
adapted from the Federal Reserve’s test for evaluating banking firms. This test adds to the 
traditional forecasting process “adverse” and “severe” outlooks to show policymakers the 
potential fiscal health of Utah in the event of a minor economic downturn or even another Great 
Recession. With three versions of a long-term forecast, policymakers can weigh the potential 
consequences of choosing a more or less conservative approach against the long-term fiscal 
health of the state. In the southeast, Virginia’s consensus forecasting groups estimate positive, 
standard, and negative revenue forecasts, but the practice needs to be expanded to long-term 
projections for revenues, expenditures and major programs. 
 
Table 2. Availability of Multi-year Forecasts and Assumptions, FY 2015-17  
BUDGET CYCLE 
MULTI-YEAR 
REVENUE 
FORECASTS 
MULTI-YEAR 
EXPENDITURE 
FORECASTS 
MULTI-YEAR 
MAJOR 
PROGRAM 
FORECASTS 
MULTI-YEAR 
TAX 
EXPENDITURE 
FORECASTS 
Alabama A N N N C 
Alaska A Y1 Y2 Y2 N 
Arizona A Y1 Y1 Y1 C 
Arkansas A Y1 N N R 
California A Y1 Y1 Y1 F 
Colorado A N N N R 
Connecticut B Y1 Y1 Y1 C 
Delaware A Y1 N N C 
Florida A Y1 Y3 Y3 C 
Georgia A Y3 Y2 N C 
Hawaii B Y1 Y1 Y1 R* 
Idaho A N N N C 
Illinois A Y1 Y1 Y1 N* 
Indiana B N N N N* 
Iowa A N N N N* 
Kansas A N N N N* 
Kentucky B Y1 N N C^ 
Louisiana A Y1 N N C 
Maine B Y1 N N C^ 
Maryland A Y1 Y1 N C 
Massachusetts A N N N C 
Michigan A N N N C 
Minnesota B Y1 Y1 Y1 F 
Mississippi A Y2 Y2 N C 
Missouri A N N N N 
Montana B N N N C 
Nebraska B Y2 N N C 
Nevada B N N N R 
New Hampshire B N N N R 
New Jersey A N N N C 
14 
cslf.gsu.edu  Fiscal Transparency and Accountability 
New Mexico A Y3 N N R 
New York A Y1 Y1 Y1 R 
North Carolina B Y1 Y3 N C 
North Dakota B N N N N 
Ohio B N N N C^ 
Oklahoma A Y1 Y1 N C 
Oregon B Y1 N N C^ 
Pennsylvania A Y2 Y2 Y2 F 
Rhode Island A Y2 Y2 Y2 C 
South Carolina A Y1 Y3 Y3 N* 
South Dakota A Y2 Y2 Y2 C 
Tennessee A N N N C* 
Texas B N N N F 
Utah A N N N N* 
Vermont A Y1 N N C 
Virginia B Y1 Y3 Y3 N* 
Washington B Y1 Y1 N F* 
West Virginia A Y2 Y2 Y2 C 
Wisconsin B N N N R 
Wyoming B Y1 N N N 
Note: Answers may not match with Volcker Alliance responses because of definition differences. 
A: Annual; B: Biennial; N: Not available; C: Current year only; F: three future years available; R: retrospective 
analysis only; Y: Yes; N: No 
Y1: Multi-year forecast information can be easily found through Google search of "[state] [topic keywords]" (e.g., 
"Florida revenue forecast"); search results link directly to document with the information or to related page where 
document can be easily found; Topic Keywords for each search: revenue forecast, expenditure forecast/outlook, 
tax expenditure/break/abatement/credit, public education/Medicaid revenue/expenditures 
Y2: Information is in the budget documents but requires searching executive/legislative websites or detailed search 
of budget; an average citizen could locate it. 
Y3: Information is in the budget documents but difficult to find or requires expert knowledge. 
^ Forecast not three full years; *Reports are made but are not annual/biennial or are not consistent. 
OTHER LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 
Other long-term liabilities proved a challenge to find in the budget documents (Table 3 below). As 
mentioned above, the CAFR is not considered a budget document in this analysis because it gives 
a retrospective view of long-term liabilities, produced well after the end of the analyzed fiscal 
year; similarly, bond documents often pull financial information from the CAFR and are not 
considered budget documents in this context. Most debt affordability studies were also excluded 
as budget documentation. Many states now produce debt affordability or debt capacity studies, 
but they differ widely in the regularity, timeliness and quality of these reports. Even debt reports 
that coincide with the release of the executive budget document are often difficult to locate; 
indeed, the average citizen (and potentially an expert researcher) would likely need to know in 
advance that the state produces a debt affordability study to find it. 
With regard to pensions and OPEB, only Connecticut and Hawaii include multi-year annual 
required contributions (ARC), with Illinois including only the pension ARC. For the other states, 
while some budget documents talk about pension funding levels or total contributions, none 
define the current or upcoming budget cycle’s ARC, or the actual intended contributions relative 
to the ARC, in the budget documents. Furthermore, only California includes a multi-year estimate 
of cumulative deferred maintenance cost projections in the budget documents. Alaska and 
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Hawaii include comprehensive deferred maintenance costs but only for the current and recent 
fiscal years. Some states incorporate individual agencies or items used to address deferred 
maintenance, like Kentucky and West Virginia, but the information is incomplete and does not 
project into the future. Many states have debt service requirements in the budget documents, 
but only 16 display future debt service in a schedule or table: Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and West Virginia. 
In its long-range financial outlook, Florida produces a concise and complete analysis of its debt 
profile. The state compares projected debt issuance and debt service to historical levels, parallels 
its debt profile to national and peer groups medians and translates the information into easily 
readable graphs and tables. West Virginia gives one of the most complete analyses of its debt. 
The executive budget document compares the debt burden to other states rated similarly by 
Moody’s Investors Service as a per capita value and in terms of the percentage of income; it also 
discusses debt policy and the debt spending limits of every state-level issuing authority. For both 
general obligation and revenue bonds, the total outstanding obligations are projected at least five 
years into the future, and debt service requirements are projected through full repayment. 
 
Table 3. Availability of Multi-year Forecasts and Assumptions for Other Long-
term Obligations, FY 2015-17 
 
DEBT 
AFFORDABILITY/ 
CAPACITY 
STUDIES 
DEBT SERVICE 
SCHEDULE 
FORECASTS† 
PENSION 
REQUIREMENTS 
FORECASTS 
INCLUDING ARC 
OPEB 
REQUIREMENTS 
FORECASTS 
INCLUDING ARC 
DEFERRED 
MAINTENANCE  
FORECASTS 
Alabama N F N N N 
Alaska Y C N N C 
Arizona N C N N N 
Arkansas N C N N N 
California Y F N N F 
Colorado N N N N N 
Connecticut Y C F F N 
Delaware N C N N N 
Florida Y F N N N 
Georgia Y C N N N 
Hawaii Y C F F C 
Idaho N C N N N 
Illinois Y F F N N 
Indiana N N N N N 
Iowa N N N N N 
Kansas Y C N N N 
Kentucky N C N N N 
Louisiana Y C N N N 
Maine N F N N N 
Maryland Y F N N N 
Massachusetts Y C C C N 
Michigan N N N N N 
Minnesota Y F N N N 
Mississippi Y C N N N 
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Missouri N F N N N 
Montana N N N N N 
Nebraska N N N N N 
Nevada Y N N N N 
New Hampshire Y N N N N 
New Jersey Y C N N N 
New Mexico Y C N  N N 
New York N F N N N 
North Carolina Y C N N N 
North Dakota N N^ N N N 
Ohio N N N N N 
Oklahoma N C N N N 
Oregon Y F N N N 
Pennsylvania N F N N N 
Rhode Island Y F N N N 
South Carolina Y C N N N 
South Dakota Y F N N N 
Tennessee Y F N N N 
Texas Y N N N N 
Utah N C N N N 
Vermont Y C N N N 
Virginia Y C N N N 
Washington Y F N N N 
West Virginia Y F N N N 
Wisconsin N N N N N 
Wyoming N N^ N N N 
†May not match Volcker Alliance responses because we do not include CAFR as budget document 
Y: Yes; F: At least three future fiscal years available; C: Current/upcoming fiscal year or biennium available only; N: 
No or information is not available in the budget documents online;  
^Does not have general obligation bonds outstanding as of FY 2017 
Conclusion 
Every state has room to improve its transparency practices to ensure better fiscal health and 
governmental accountability. We can see that every state has made some kind of effort to disclose fiscal 
information through a transparency website, but the information varies among states. Without all the 
relevant revenues, expenditures and liabilities projected into the future, states cannot clearly relay their 
financial position to their citizens. No state fulfilled all of our criteria—this is particularly apparent in the 
lack of future pension and OPEB liability projections, where many states have significantly underfunded 
systems but do not clearly show how these problems may affect future generations. Ultimately, states 
should aim to produce a single, multi-year forecasting document that encompasses revenues, 
expenditures, other long-term obligations and their detailed assumptions, so that structural balance and 
overall fiscal health are readily apparent to the public.  
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